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In this report we discuss the insecurity with present implementations of the Ekert protocol for
quantum-key distribution based on the Wigner Inequality. We propose a modified version of this
inequality which guarantees safe quantum-key distribution.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.-a, 03.65.Ud
Following the first proposal by Bennett and Brassard
[1] and the later introduction of the Ekert protocol invok-
ing entangled states [2], various systems of quantum key
distribution (QKD) have been implemented and tested
by groups around the world, turning QKD into the most
advanced application in quantum information science.
QKD offers the possibility that two remote parties,
conventionally called Alice and Bob, exchange a secret
random key to implement a secure encryption-decryption
algorithm, without meeting [1, 2, 3]. QKD provides a
significant advantage over the public-key cryptography
because the security of the distributed key relies on the
laws of quantum physics [1, 2, 3], i.e. the wave packet
collapse prohibits gaining information from a quantum
channel without disturbing it. Indeed, any attempt by a
third party (Eve) to obtain information about the key is
detected.
Two main goals underly the implementation of QKD
schemes. One is to create and preserve authentic quan-
tum channels against decoherence effects induced by any
interaction with the environment [4], eventually reduc-
ing or even destroying invulnerability of quantum chan-
nels against Eve’s attack. The other is to provide a true
guarantee of absolute security against any possible eaves-
dropping attack i.e. the security is not simply based on
technological feasibility.
Scientists are currently using one of two photon sources
for practical QKD, faint lasers [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] or sponta-
neous parametric down-conversion to generate entangled
photon states (SPDC) [11, 12, 13, 14, 15].
Both schemes have disadvantages, although Brassard
et al. [16] proved theoretically that QKD schemes based
on entangled photons offer enhanced performance and se-
curity relative to schemes based on weak coherent pulses.
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FIG. 1: QKD set-up: polarization entangled photons gen-
erated by SPDC are directed to the two parties (Alice and
Bob). The bit sequence of the key is obtained by means of
polarization sensitive synchronized measurements performed
by Alice and Bob according to a specific QKD protocol.
In fact, entangled states allow a further test of secu-
rity based on the completeness of quantum mechanics;
in other words, the Ekert protocol exploits either the
Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) [2] or the Wigner
inequality [13] as an ultimate test of eavesdropping at-
tack.
Wigner’s inequality was originally intended [13] to pro-
vide an easier but as equally reliable eavesdropping check
as the CHSH test in implementing the Ekert protocol.
In this report we disclose the weakness of the Wigner in-
equality as a security test when Eve has the total control
of quantum channels.
In Fig. 1 we depict a typical scheme for QKD by means
of entangled photons. QKD performed by pure entangled
states relies on the realization of two quantum-correlated
optical channels yielding quasi single-photon polarization
states. Alice’s measurement of the polarization of a pho-
ton of the pair, automatically projects Bob’s photon into
a defined polarization state, and reversibility. Alice’s
and Bob’s detection apparatuses are built using polar-
2ization analyzer systems (PAS), polarizing beam split-
ters (PBS), detectors (+A, −A, +B, −B), data storage
systems (computers), and synchronization systems.
Consider, as an example, type II parametric down-
conversion entangled states [17], where the output two-
photon states are a quantum superposition of orthogo-
nally polarized photons, i.e. in the singlet state∣∣ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|HA〉 |VB〉 − |VA〉 |HB〉) .
Without any loss of generality, a particular QKD pro-
cedure can be described by the transformations, T̂z,with
z = A,B, on the polarization state of a photon, e.g. a
rotation of angles αA and αB respectively according to
T̂z |Hz〉 = cosαz |Hz〉+ sinαz |Vz〉 ,
T̂z |Vz〉 = sinαz |Hz〉 − cosαz |Vz〉 .
We assume ideal PBS in channel z transmitting pho-
tons in the state |Hz〉 towards detectors +z and reflecting
photons in the state |Vz〉 towards detector −z.
The joint probabilities of each possible pair of detectors
firing due to the arrival of a photon pair with PAS angles
of αA and αB are given by
pαA,αB (+A,+B) =
∣∣∣〈HB| 〈HA| T̂AT̂B ∣∣ψ−〉∣∣∣2
=
1
2
sin2(αA − αB)
pαA,αB (+A,−B) =
∣∣∣〈VB | 〈HA| T̂AT̂B ∣∣ψ−〉∣∣∣2
=
1
2
cos2(αA − αB)
pαA,αB (−A,+B) =
∣∣∣〈HB| 〈VA| T̂AT̂B ∣∣ψ−〉∣∣∣2
=
1
2
cos2(αA − αB)
pαA,αB (−A,−B) =
∣∣∣〈VB | 〈VA| T̂AT̂B ∣∣ψ−〉∣∣∣2
=
1
2
sin2(αA − αB).
Here, we consider the variant of the Ekert protocol
based on the Wigner inequality originally proposed in
ref. [13]. For the analyzer settings the possible combined
choices by Alice and Bob can be split into two groups:
the first for key distribution and the second testing secu-
rity. We assume Alice and Bob measure randomly among
four combined analyzer settings. Alice’s possible choices
are αA = (αA,1 = −pi/6, αA,2 = 0) and Bob’s possible
choices are αB = (αB,2 = 0, αB,3 = pi/6). The key is ob-
tained from the subset of measurements corresponding
to parallel PAS settings (i.e. αA,i = αB,i = 0) and the
firing detectors +A−B and −A+B.
The Wigner inequality is based on the Wigner param-
eter
W = pαA,1,αB,2(+A,+B) + pαA,2,αB,3(+A,+B)
−pαA,1,αB,3(+A,+B). (1)
Note that for the maximally entangled states W = −1/8
while for any local realistic theory W ≥ 0.
To obtain the Wigner inequality W ≥ 0 it is necessary
to summarize the Wigner argument [18]. Two assump-
tions are stipulated in the proofs of the Wigner inequal-
ity: locality and realism. Locality means that Alice’s
measurement results do not influence Bob’s results, and
vice versa. Realism means that, given any physical prop-
erty its value exists independently of its observation or
measurement.
In the present case this is translated in terms of a clas-
sical probability distribution, P(x1, x2; y2, y3), where x1
and x2 are the hidden variables associated with the phys-
ical property inducing Alice’s measurement outcome in
the presence of the PAS rotation angle αA,i. Similarly
y2 and y3 correspond to the physical property inducing
Bob’s outcomes when PAS angle is set as αB,2 and αB,3.
Thus, we can identify the possible values of x1,2 and y2,3
with Alice and Bob’s measurement outcomes, in other
words x1,2 = +A,−A and y2,3 = +B,−B. Following the
Wigner approach we write,
pαA,1,αB,3(+A,+B) =
∑
x2,y2
P(+A, x2; y2,+B)
= P(+A,+A; +B,+B) + P(+A,−A;−B,+B)
+P(+A,+A;−B,+B) + P(+A,−A; +B,+B). (2)
In Wigner’s original paper [18], αA,2 = αB,2 and
P(x1,+A; +B, y3) = P(x1,−A;−B, y3) = 0. The as-
sumption of perfect anticorrelation is obviously reason-
able in the test of realism and locality of a physi-
cal theory, because it reflects the classical counterpart
of a quantum system prepared in the singlet state,
i.e. pαA,2,αB,2(+A,+B) = pαA,2,αB,2(−A,−B) = 0.
Thus, the inequality W ≥ 0 is obtained from Eq.
(2) by simply observing that P(+A,−A; +B,+B) ≤∑
x2,y3
P(+A, x2; +B, y3) = pαA,1,αB,2(+A,+B) and
P(+A,+A;−B,+B) ≤
∑
x1,y2
P(x1,+A; y2,+B) =
pαA,2,αB,3(+A,+B).
Ref.s [13, 19] suggest to be cautious in applying
Wigner’s inequality to test the security of cryptogra-
phy schemes, since authors are aware that the Wigner’s
inequality is derived assuming perfect anticorrelations,
which are only approximately realized in practical situa-
tions. Nevertheless a punctual quantification of the inse-
curity induced by this assumption in the Ekert protocol
based on Wigner’s inequality has never been pointed out.
In particular, after stating that the violation of the
Wigner’s inequality ascertains the security of the quan-
tum channels, Ref. [13] suggests to replace the Wigner’s
inequality by the generalization of the Bell’s inequality
presented in Ref. [20] for a substantial deviation from
perfect anticorrelations. This last point has been over-
looked by most readers probably because it is not clear
what a ”substantial deviation from the perfect anticorre-
lations” is.
When the eavesdropper, Eve, measures photons on ei-
ther one or both of Alice’s and Bob’s channels, her pres-
3ence might be expected to be revealed by a higher value
of W than the local realistic theory limit, as it happens
for the CHSH inequality [2]. Unfortunately this is not
the case. Even if it can be proved that, for Eve adopting
intercept-resend strategy and detecting only one photon
of the pair, the limit becomes Weve ≥ 1/16, this is not
for eavesdropping on both channels, because in this case
there is no bound.
A proof of this last assertion, according to ref. [2],
can be obtained by considering Eve preparing each par-
ticle of the pairs separately, so that each individual
particle has a well defined polarization direction, pos-
sibly varying from pair to pair. We write the prob-
ability P (ΦA,ΦB) of having Alice’s particle in state
|ΦA〉, and Bob’s particle in state |ΦB〉, where ΦA and
ΦB are two angles of Eve’s polarization preparation i.e.
|Φz〉 = cosΦz |Hz〉 + sinΦz |Vz〉. If the density oper-
ator associated with Eve’s pairs of photons is ρ̂eve =∫
P (ΦA,ΦB) |ΦA〉 |ΦB〉 〈ΦB| 〈ΦA|dΦAdΦB, then
Weve =
∫
P (ΦA,ΦB)
[
cos2(ΦA +
pi
6
) cos2ΦB + cos
2ΦA cos
2(ΦB − pi6 )−
cos2(ΦA +
pi
6
) cos2(ΦB − pi6 )
]
dΦAdΦB. (3)
In the case of single-channel eavesdropping with
intercept-resend strategy, the anticorrelation between the
two photons in the Eve measurement base is preserved
because ΦB = ΦA− pi/2, and thus Weve ≥ 1/16. In
the most general case, when Eve has the total control
over the state of individual particles, there is no physi-
cal bound, as Weve results in some cases below the limit
of local realistic theory, i.e. Weve < 0 and surprisingly
also below the quantum limit Weve < −1/8. For in-
stance, if Eve gains total control of the source of pho-
tons, she can send photons in proper polarization states
to avoid disclosure by a security test by Alice and Bob,
and for P (ΦA,ΦB) = δ(ΦA−0.6pi)δ(ΦB−0.4pi) the value
Weve = −0.1995 is below the quantum limit.
In other words, the guarantee of Wigner’s security test
against eavesdropping strategies is limited only to the
detection of one photon of the pairs while the CHSH
security is independent from the adopted strategy [2].
Therefore, we end up with a modified Wigner’s
parameter W˜ suitable for QKD security test by
removing from Wigner’s original argument the anti-
correlation assumption when αA,2 = αB,2. Starting
again from Eq. (2) but rejecting the assumption
pαA,2,αB,2(+A,+B) = pαA,2,αB,2(−A,−B) = 0 and ob-
serving that P(+A,+A; +B,+B)+P(+A,−A; +B,+B) ≤
pαA,1,αB,2(+A,+B), P(+A,+A;−B,+B) ≤
pαA,2,αB,3(+A,+B) and P(+A,−A;−B,+B) ≤
pαA,2,αB,2(−A,−B), we obtain
W˜ = pαA,1,αB,2(+A,+B) + pαA,2,αB,3(+A,+B) (4)
+pαA,2,αB,2(−A,−B)− pαA,1,αB,3(+A,+B) ≥ 0.
for any local realistic theory.
We finally observe that for the singlet state we still
obtain W˜ = −1/8 also in this case. This result happens
because the modified parameter W˜ equals the originalW
except for the additional term pαA,2,αB,2(−A,−B), which
is zero in the case of singlet state.
To demonstrate the robustness of this security test
against an eavesdropping attack we perform a calcula-
tion analogous to Eq. (3)
W˜eve =
∫
P (ΦA,ΦB)
[
cos2(ΦA +
pi
6
) cos2ΦB + cos
2ΦA cos
2(ΦB − pi6 )
+ sin2(ΦA) sin
2(ΦB)− cos2(ΦA + pi6 ) cos2(ΦB − pi6 )
]
dΦAdΦB.
Even in the general case when Eve has total control of
the polarization states of photons in the two channels, we
obtain that the minimum of W˜eve = 0.04428, well above
the limit for local realistic theory. This result is com-
pletely equivalent to the one obtained with the security
test based on the CHSH inequality [2].
Some further analysis of W˜ must be considered for
the practical implementation of the Ekert protocol based
on Wigner’s inequality. According to [13], we highlight
that the Ekert’s protocol based on modified Wigner’s in-
equality still guarantees a simplification with respect to
the one based on the CHSH inequality, because Alice
and Bob randomly choose between two bases rather than
three. Though the necessity of an experimental evalua-
tion of the term pαA,2,αB,2(−A,−B) forces Alice and Bob
to sacrifice part of the key for the sake of security. We
4Aα 1,Aα 2,Aα 3,Aα
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K
K
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TABLE I: Distribution of data for Alice and Bob’s analyzer
settings αA,1, αA,2 and αB,2, αB,3 respectively. The dotted
square is the original protocol of T. Jennewein, C. Simon, G.
Weihs, H. Weinfurter and A. Zeilinger, Phys. Rev Lett. 84,
4729 (2000).
note that in any practical implementation of QKD pro-
tocols, Alice and Bob distill from the noisy sifted key a
nearly noise-free corrected key by means of error correc-
tion procedures subjected to the constraint of knowing
the quantum bit error rate (QBER). Also, the QBER is
estimated at the cost of losing part of the key. Thus,
we suggest using the same sacrificed part of the key to
estimate both W˜ and QBER.
To compare the performances of the Ekert protocol
based on Wigner’s inequality versus the one CHSH-based
[2] we consider a protocol (Table I) where Alice and
Bob measure randomly using three analyzer settings (as
in the case of CHSH), where αA,1 = αB,1 = −pi/6,
αA,2 = αB,2 = 0 and αA,3 = αB,3 = pi/6. W˜ and W˜
′
correspond to two distinct test parameters and K to the
key distribution. This protocol is more efficient than the
protocol based on CHSH. In terms of key generation we
observe that in the case of CHSH only 2/9 of the qubits
exchanged are devoted to the key generation [2] while in
the case of our protocol this quantity is a number between
2/9 and 1/3, depending on the security needs.
Even if, for some strict security request, all the qubits
exchanged by the two parties with analyzer settings αA,2,
αB,2 are devoted to the evaluation of W˜ (W˜
′), and also
for this protocol only 2/9 of the data still contribute to
the key, in this protocol none of the qubits exchanged are
discarded (Table I) while in the case of CHSH 1/3 of the
qubits are discarded.
The results so far obtained allow us to quantify the
so called ”substantial deviation from prefect anticorrela-
tions” as that value of the QBER such that the quantum
key distribution fails, because the key is insecure even if
the Wigner’s inequality is violated.
For the original protocol introduced in [13] the QBER
of the key is the probability of correlated results when
analyzer settings are αA,2, αB,2, i.e.
QBER = pαA,2,αB,2(−A,−B) + pαA,2,αB,2(+A,+B).
Thus, this leads to
0 ≤ W˜ ≤W + pαA,2,αB,2(−A,−B) + pαA,2,αB,2(−A,−B),
which can be easily rewritten in terms of QBER as
QBER+W ≥ 0. (5)
Thanks to the modified Wigner’s inequality a limit is
found for both W and the anticorrelation check. Thus,
for the Ekert’s protocol based on the original Wigner’s
inequality a secure key distribution is provided when, in-
stead of the violation of the Wigner’s inequality (W ≥ 0),
the Wigner’s parameter W satisfies W ≤ −QBER. Eq.
(5) and the related considerations obviously still hold for
the enlarged protocol presented in Table I. Here one has
to consider only the QBER of that part of the key ob-
tained with analyzers settings αA,2, αB,2, and not the
QBER of the whole key.
As a final remark we highlight that our approach not
only solves the problem of estimating the ”substantial de-
viation from the perfect anticorrelations” but completely
overtakes it. Following our approach the experimental-
ist has simply to check the modified Wigner’s inequality
from his experimental data to guarantee non-locality, i.e.
security of the quantum channels as in the original Ek-
ert’s idea [2], without any further anticorrelation check.
Furthermore, the experimentalist in a noisy environ-
ment can discard a secure key when Eq. (5) is used in-
stead of the modified Wigner’s inequality, since W˜ ≤
W+QBER.
In conclusion, this paper discusses the security of Ek-
ert’s protocol based on the Wigner inequality. We showed
that the QKD Ekert protocol based on Wigner’s inequal-
ity presents a serious lack of security against some eaves-
dropping strategies other than intercept-resend. We em-
phasized the motivation beneath the missing security and
propose a modified test ultimately guaranteeing secure
QKD.
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